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ABSTRACT 
Insiders can engage in malicious activities against organizations such as data theft and sabotage. 
Prior research on insider threat behavior indicates that once motivated to commit malicious 
activity, insiders seek opportunity where they can act without being detected. In this research we 
set up an experiment where we leverage this opportunistic behavior and present participants with 
messages signaling opportunity for data theft. In the experiment, students were engaged in 
routine tasks with a bonus based on their performance. While working on their assigned tasks, 
they were presented with opportunities (probes) to steal data that would increase their payout. 
Their pre and post probe behavior was observed to test if they engaged in behavior that was 
deemed suspicious when they received the probe. The goal of the project is to test whether the 
overclaiming personality trait is a predictor of malicious insider behavior and this was measured 
through the Over Claiming questionnaire developed by Paulhaus (Paulhaus et al. 2003) The 
results indicated that over claiming proved to be a strong predictor of malicious insider behavior.  
Keywords: Over-Claiming, Behavioral Security, Cybersecurity, Insider Threat Detection 
______________________ 
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INTRODUCTION 
Insider threats continue to comprise a large proportion of cyber-security breaches in 
organizations and constitute approximately half of all such incidents (Richardson 2008). 
Healthcare, education, and government agencies all have proven particularly susceptible to the 
problem posed by insider threats (Verizon 2018). Many experts believe that cybersecurity 
incidents caused by insiders are more damaging than external breaches (RSA 2016). Excessive 
user privilege, the litany of devices that have access to sensitive information, and the increasing 
complexity of networks are examples of the challenges that leave 90% of businesses feeling 
vulnerable to insider threats. (C.A Technologies 2018). 
There is a strong impetus to identify insider threats prior to their manifestation in the 
organization. It is imperative that we can understand the motivations, proclivities, and 
dispositional characteristics predictive of human behavior that triggers malicious behavior of 
insiders. Resting upon the axiom that humans tend not to act randomly, we can come to 
understand the psychological underpinnings of the malicious insider’s actions, and furthermore 
look to assess the factors that trigger the need for stealing data.  Insider threat can be examined 
through what is referred to as the insider threat kill chain, this begins with radicalization of the 
worker (a trigger point) wherein he becomes motivated to commit a malicious act. This is 
followed by searching for opportunities to engage in malicious insider behavior, and finally leads 
to the malicious act (e.g, exfiltrating data) when the opportunity arises (Colwill 2009).  
We can mitigate the damage from insider attacks by intervening in the process at any point in the 
insider threat kill chain prior to data exfiltration. Recently, research was conducted that 
manipulated whether users received bogus messages indicating that they were performing below 
average, followed by a probing message that informed participants as to the status of the 
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network, as relevant to cyber-security.  It was revealed that when looking to data obtained prior 
to the reconnaissance stage where subjects were seeking opportunities to exfiltrate data, 
researchers were able to predict, with reasonable accuracy, the malicious from the benevolent 
insider (Goel et al. 2016; Goel et al. 2017). In this experiment, honeytokens (fake, baited 
opportunities) were presented to the subjects with the contention that malicious subjects, seeking 
opportunity, would respond differently to the threats compared to benign subjects. This work 
leverages the experimental setup of this previous work to look at “overclaiming”, which simply 
put is a measure of exaggeration in identifying one’s knowledge, as a predictor of malicious 
insider behavior.  
A confluence of factors motivates an individual to engage in conscious insider theft. The factors 
involved are both dispositional (personality) and situational (circumstances), and it is important 
to note that the interaction between the two is generally of greatest interest as it is often the case 
that circumstance serves as the catalyst for the realization of particular, malicious actions. The 
dispositional factors that we have previously investigated included the Big Five personality 
characteristics (McCrae and Costa 1999), the Dark Triad (Paulhus and Williams 2002; measures 
subclinical: Narcissism, Psychopathy, and Machiavellianism), self-esteem (Rosenberg 1965), 
general self-efficacy (Gardner and Pierce, 1998, technological proficiency. The current research 
attempts to understand the interactions in individuals who over-claim their knowledge on a 
subject and their proclivity to steal data. 
In the present research, we have designed a task where participants were assigned with 
researching and finding notable information on hacking groups, with a monetary incentive 
provided for participation as well as the prospect of additional monetary compensation for 
excellent performance. Unbeknownst to the subject, we provided opportunities to steal data that 
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allowed one to improve productivity during the experiment and measured their behavior via 
sensors installed on the computer. We then examined the role of personality, including data from 
the personality inventories collected from subjects prior to the task and included these as 
variables in a series of statistical analyses that attempted to elucidate predictive factors of the 
malicious insider threat. The rest of the paper is described as follows. Section 2 provides a brief 
review of the literature followed by a detailed description of personality as well as the impact of 
over-claiming in the context of insider threats in Section 3. Section 4 provides the details of the 
experiments and section 5 the results of the experiments. Section 6 provides a brief conclusion 
and plans for prospective future research.   
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Since individuals have begun to attack computer systems, researchers have attempted to build 
profiles to understand the underlying psychological characteristics of hackers. Landreth and 
Rheingold (1985) first proposed the idea of classifying hackers by skill level and building a 
psychological profile around a hacker’s abilities. This idea was recently notably revisited by 
Kandias et al. (2010), who proposed using user’s technical sophistication and their role on a 
computer system or network as elements in a prediction model for insider threats. Additionally, 
Kandias et al. (2010) combined these variables with self-reported responses to the Computer 
Crime and Social Learning Questionnaire (Rogers 2001) to determine the likelihood a stressful 
event could result in an individual acting maliciously. The major limitation of this approach is 
that the responses are likely to be affected by self-report bias, as insiders are unlikely to 
comfortably admit in an anonymous survey that they are acting against the organization that has 
placed trust in them. 
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The situational factors involved in scenarios where individuals make the transition from trusted 
insider to insider threat are well reviewed in the current literature (e.g., Shaw 2006). Shaw 
(2006) produced a major review of the behavioral characteristics exhibited by insider threats. 
The major findings presented in this review indicated that 81% of insiders planned their attacks 
in advance of carrying them out, and 85% of insiders told a third party of their plans to commit a 
malicious action. Shaw (2006) also reported that individuals who become insiders are likely to 
be experiencing behavioral and emotional issues. It was also reported that malicious insiders 
were especially likely to have a strong negative affect towards their workplace. Shaw (2006) also 
analyzed the email correspondence of individuals who exhibited insider threat behavior and 
discovered that insiders displayed superior intelligence, high rigidity, arrogance, and generally 
speaking, the characteristics of a social “loner”.  
Beyond the work of Shaw (2006), Greitzer and Hohimer (2011) proposed using behavioral 
modeling to predict if individuals were likely to become insiders, albeit in a different fashion. 
They first proposed using linguistic cues to detect insiders, through the terms they use to respond 
to cues presented (e.g., a potential insider would respond to _ight with fight, non-insiders would 
respond with tight). Additionally, the authors propose applying the well-known Stroop Task for 
the detection of insiders. In this task, words are presented in a fashion that inhibits reaction time 
by the respondent (Stroop 1935). The Emotional Stroop Task (McKenna and Sharma 1995) 
provides fear-eliciting stimuli to subjects, which much like the original Stroop Task, inhibit 
response times for those items which induce fear, as would be the case when an individual who 
is worried about revealing their insider tendencies is presented a word relevant to their malicious 
activities (e.g., “steal”) would be inhibited from responding (Richards et al. 1992).  
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Furthermore, there has been an examination of the role of dispositional and situational factors in 
promoting compliant behavior. Johnston et al. (2016)  used a scenario-based survey approach to 
test how the dispositional and situational factors impact an employee’s security policy violation 
intentions when aggregated (Johnston et al. 2016). The authors identify two meta-traits (i.e., 
Stability and Plasticity) that serve as moderators of the relationships between perceptions derived 
from situational factors and intentions to violate information security policy (DeYoung 2006). 
The researchers concluded that the differences between individuals who exhibit the stability 
meta-trait versus the plasticity meta-trait precludes the use of standardized interventions to 
prevent insider activity (Johnston et al. 2016).  
Despite the modicum of ingenuity in attempting to profile and predict malicious insider threats, 
there is a clear paucity in well-validated methods that combine digital threat detection with 
psychological profiling to predict malicious insider behavior. Despite a handful of experiments 
that have looked at traditional personality traits (i.e., The Big Five), nuance and sophistication 
have been limited in such approaches, and as such, there is a distinct lack of efficacy in 
proactively detecting insider threat. The present research attempts to more effectively use 
psychological variables in hopes of ultimately furthering the sophistication of methods in the 
early detection of the malicious insider. To the best of our knowledge this is the first examination 
of the interaction between over-claiming as a personality characteristic investigating the 
malicious insider threat. 
OVERCLAIMING 
Researchers have often struggled with self-report measures, particularly because “self-
enhancement” is considered by the psychological community as one of the three main needs for 
the self (Baumeister 1982). What this means is that individuals naturally look to self-present in a 
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fashion that depicts them more favorably to others. The search for an effective means to counter 
this problem has largely been disappointing (Paulhus 1991). The most notable and prevalent 
attempts to counter this problem have been the use of scales to determine to what extent 
individuals respond in a way that is deemed favorable based on the group norm, intrapsychic 
measures where the extent to which individuals rate themselves as better than average is 
assessed, and credible criterion discrepancy measures (Paulhus et al. 2003), which essentially 
attempt to identify forms of exaggeration, or self-enhancement, that is wholly unwarranted given 
a specific context. Largely, these and similar scales have not reached the level of empirical rigor 
that is deemed necessary to mollify the problem at hand. 
In response to the weaknesses of such prior attempts to mollify this issue, The Over-Claiming 
Questionnaire (OCQ; Paulhus et al. 2003) was implemented as a measure of “faking” behavior, 
in that it presents participants with a set of items from different domains (social sciences, history, 
arts, etc.), 20% of which are bogus. It should also be noted that in our iteration of the over-
claiming scale, we adopted items (from a repository made available online by Paulhus and 
colleagues) relevant to modern technology and computers and created our own category of 
cyber-security items, including a set of original foils that represent no existing cyber-security 
construct. In completing the OCQ, participants rated the familiarity of items presented to them 
on a 7-point scale anchored at 0 (never heard of it) and 6 (know it very well). The extent to which 
participants rate familiarity with items that simply do not exist indicates their bias for over-
claiming. Additionally, bias on the OCQ can be used as a covariate in statistical analyses by 
accounting for exaggeration in socially desirable responding, and thus bolstering the accuracy of 
standard self-reported measures by statistically controlling for faking behavior, as we have done 
in this research. 
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However, the OCQ also is inherently a measure of faking, or rather exaggeration. Such behavior 
has been referred to in various ways including but not limited to positive self-presentation, and 
self-deceptive enhancement (Paulhus 1984; Paulhus and Reid 1991): two different motivated 
actions that at face value seem rather similar. It is to be noted for the purposes of the present 
research, that in low demand conditions, where there is little prospect of being unfavorably 
judged (e.g., completing the OCQ knowing that you will not, and cannot be identified), high 
levels of bias in over-claiming has been referred to as narcissistic self-enhancement (Paulhus 
1998), as individuals exaggerate their self-perception without much reward. In this sense, the 
OCQ is seen in the present experiment as a low-demand scenario, and as such serves as a robust 
methodological analog to deviance relevant to various forms of deception, and specific to the 
present experiment, the exfiltration of other’s data.  
EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
In this experiment undergraduate students studying computer science and cyber-security were 
recruited as participants and were given a monetary incentive to participate in a hacker-research 
task which had participants identify particular notable hacking groups, their members, notable 
characteristics, known attacks, etc. Participants were given forty minutes to research as many 
hacker groups as they could. Subjects were told to save their results in a publicly accessible 
shared directory so that their results could be evaluated by the experimenters. Participants were 
told that they would be compensated based on their performance on the task, with additional 
rewards for outstanding performance. The nature of the monetary compensation made it so there 
was an incentive to cheat via the copying of another subject’s results from the shared drive. In 
addition to the pressure that resulted from the design, a message was sent to half of the subjects 
at the fifteen-minute mark that fostered a sense of urgency, by asking them how many groups 
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they had completed their research on, and then informing half of the subjects them that they were 
performing below the average subject in terms of the number of groups adequately researched. 
Subsequently, all of the subjects were sent a probe message that indicated an opportunity for data 
theft. By sending messages to participants, we manipulated the perceived affordances and level 
of risk associated with data exfiltration. A computer laboratory was set up for the experiments 
where the computers were equipped with Keylogging software (Veriato360 and NetVisor). Data 
theft behavior was measured through the use of this keylogging software such that keystrokes 
were recorded and then analyzed to detect file and directory access (indicating data theft). Three 
primary forms of action were operationalized and analyzed based on data collected via user 
activity monitoring software: 
[1] Curiosity: The opening of other participant’s folders on the shared drive  
[2] File Opening: Opening of other participant's files in the shared drive  
[3] Theft: Copying another participant’s work from files that were improperly accessed on 
the shared drive 
The specific task for participants was to conduct research on hacker groups and catalog their 
organizational structure and activities in a file located on a shared drive on the network; each 
subject was assigned a separate file to post their results. Additionally, a project directory was 
created with a pre-filled catalog of hacker groups giving subjects an ability to copy from both 
other users and the project directory.  Five different opportunities were presented to the users to 
exfiltrate data (we call these probes) as shown below: 
Table 1. List of Probes 
Number Probe 
1 
Alert to System Administrator: Microsoft Group Policy Editor has been corrupted, all security controls 
have been disabled 
2 
Due to group policy misalignment some participants are unable to access their folders. So, we have 
changed the configuration so that all participants can access the entire shared drive 
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Please be informed that for the last 5 minutes of the task we will activate software to monitor your 
progress and inform you if you adequately cover all of the key elements in your report. 
4 
USER NOTICE: File permission error detected (0x0011532A). Patch applied (v 1.2.9_R1). Security 
update in: 10:00 mins.  Save all files prior to install to prevent data loss. 
5 
Please note that at the end of the experiment we will run all reports through SafeAssign, a software 
program that checks for plagiarism. 
The behavior was correlated with the personality of the users and the results are discussed below. 
RESULTS 
Given that the dependent variables in the present research were categorical and binary, in that 
they either represented a “yes” or a “no” in regard to an action of interest (e.g., “Did they open 
other individual’s folders?”), we conducted a series of Binary Logistic Regressions. Results 
demonstrated that for pre-probe curiosity, operationalized as opening a “taboo” folder and 
keeping it open (prior to the presentation of the probe), there was no significant effect of any 
other personality variable other than over-claiming. Greater over-claiming bias was associated 
with increased curiosity behavior in line with predictions that those who inflate their true 
knowledge would be more likely to engage in at least, “pre-malicious” behavior.  
Whether or not users opened files belonging to others was the primary dependent variable of 
interest, particularly given that operationalizing whether an individual stole data and used it to 
bolster their own performance proved to be difficult. Exploratory analyses revealed a high rate of 
error and a greatly wanting level of reliability for this dependent measure. This was a result of 
the fact that many subjects did not copy the data from their peers’ work as originally expected, 
but rather summarized the work product of many of their counterparts after reviewing a great 
number of documents.  
There was an interaction found between probe and self-evaluation, p < .05, as individuals were 
more likely to access other’s file post-probe for the messages that increased activity when they 
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were also informed that their performance was below average. In analyzing the role of 
moderating or mediating personality variables, the sample size that we acquired (N=76) left us 
with a very low observed power; particularly so for three-way interactions. This limitation was a 
function of the number of participants we were able to recruit within the allotted time-frame 
available to us. It should also be noted that given the small sample, results should be treated with 
caution as further research is necessary to firmly establish the potential role of a moderating or 
mediating personality variables.  
Additionally, the results demonstrated that greater over-claiming led to increased odds of 
opening another’s files, p < .05. This is in line with our predictions in that greater “faking” 
behavior as measured by the OCQ was believed to be positively related to a higher incidence of 
deviant behavior. Further, technological proficiency significantly predicted the greater likelihood 
of opening another’s files, p < .05. While it may be tempting to claim that this provides evidence 
that those with higher technological proficiency differ significantly in regard to their drive to 
cheat, a more probable explanation is that these individuals are the most likely to have the 
technical knowledge to more easily exfiltrate data, as compared to less technologically literate 
individuals. Also notable was that higher General Self-Esteem predicted a lesser likelihood of 
opening another’s files. In line with the prevalent view of self-esteem, which states that 
individuals with high self-esteem tend to be significantly less likely to engage in deviant or self-
deprecatory actions (e.g., Rosenberg et al. 1989) whether it be physical or social, given that their 
needs for esteem are met. (Baumeister et al. 1993). General self-efficacy, or the belief in one’s 
ability to realize a particular goal, conversely was significant in predicting a greater likelihood of 
opening another’s files, p < .05. This finding while counter to our original hypotheses, actually 
seems compelling in that individuals with high self-efficacy, who feel they have a greater 
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capacity to achieve personal goals may be more likely to perceive less threat and act more boldly 
in his context, conferring in a higher incidence in malicious insider behavior. 
The ecological validity in this particular case may be questionable, as, in other contexts (other 
than within a college classroom) that are typically less punitive in terms for stringency and 
consequences of cheating, one would expect more cheating behavior than average. Thus, this 
effect could flip as a function of the demands of the unique social environment. The present 
research would be considered far closer to the former, as cheating behavior within a university 
context is notoriously associated with highly undesirable consequences, such as expulsion. This 
limitation may conversely also introduce an area of future investigation regarding how 
differences in perceived risk, norms, and other contextual variables associated with how deviant 
behavior might be differentially perceived may affect insider actions. 
CONCLUSIONS 
In this research, we demonstrated that over-claiming is robust both in helping to mitigate error 
stemming from biases inherent to self-report data, particularly in contexts where the social 
desirability of actions may be particularly relevant. It is our hope that future research will look to 
adopt more complex and nuanced methodologies in psychologically profiling malicious insiders. 
Whereas machine-learning algorithms, Bayesian threat detection systems, and other digital tools 
that attempt to thwart cyber-attacks do demonstrate a level of efficacy in deterring insider 
threats, it is largely post hoc. We should note that malicious cyber threats from within an 
organization, is typically related to an insider with certain predispositions, motivations, varied 
perceptions of their environment, and that such actors rarely act without some level of 
deliberation, logic, and the assessment of the likely ramifications of their actions. Carefully, 
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crafted experiments that provide opportunities can reveal malicious intentions of employees prior 
to their malicious actions.  
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